Saturday, 27 October 2012

The High Cost of Rent Control

"The high cost of rent control" [http://www.nmhc.org/ThirdPartyGuidance.cfm?ItemNumber=60869]  from National Multi Housing Council describe issues on the rent ceiling at America in recent years.

A number of communities around the country continue to impose rent controls, usually with the stated goal of preserving affordable housing for low- income and middle-income families. In order to let more people can able to rent house, the government would sets the rent ceiling price below the equilibrium price in housing market. Why should rent ceiling set below the equilibrium price not set above? The reason is if government sets the rent ceiling above equilibrium price, people will   need to pay more for rent housing. Thus, if rent ceiling set above the equilibrium price in housing market has no effects. However, once the rent ceiling sets below the equilibrium price in housing market has powerful effects due to rental of housing decline that makes a great number of people be affordable. 

Diagram 1


Rent control does not advance this important goal. To the contrary, in many communities rent control has actually reduced quantity of available housing. We can see from diagram.1, when the rent is at the equilibrium level, the quantity of housing supplied equals the quantity of housing demanded and there is neither a shortage nor a surplus. But, at a rent set below the equilibrium rent, the quantity of housing demanded exceeds the quantity of housing supplied. Thus, there is a shortage in housing market.  In a tight market, there are some people looking for housing than available rental units, at this case the black market will be created. The level of a black market rent depends on how tightly the rent ceiling is enforced. With loose enforcement, the black market rent is close to the unregulated rent. But with strict enforcement, the black market rent is equal to the maximum price that a renter is willing to pay. (We also can see the maximum black market price from graph.1)

Diagram 2

The Substantial Costs of Rent Control Fall Most Heavily on the Poor. The costs of rent control fall disproportionately on the poor. Poor families suffer a marked decline in existing housing as the quality of existing housing falls in response to reduced maintenance expenditures. The middle class can move out; for many reasons, poorer families lack this option. In an unregulated market, this consumer selection process will be governed by the level of rents. However, by restricting rent levels rent control causes housing providers to turn to other factors, such as income and credit history, to choose among competing consumers. These factors tend to bias the selection process against low income families, particularly female- headed, single-parent households. At this situation, people probably have to pay more than rent ceiling price that would let people receive surplus. It’s consumer surplus, show by diagram.2.  Poor families also are at substantial disadvantages when it comes to finding new housing. In a tight market, there may be more people looking for housing than available rental units, thereby giving housing providers substantial discretion in choosing among competing potential consumers. So, renters would pay more time for searching the housing that would makes people have loss from housing search, show by diagram.2. 

Higher Income Households Benefit Most from Rent Controls. Rent control is most often justified as an anti-poverty strategy. Yet, there is strong evidence that higher income households are the principal beneficiaries of most rent control laws, not the poor. For example, a study of rent control in New York City found that rent-controlled households with incomes greater than $75,000 received nearly twice the average subsidy of rent-controlled households with incomes below $10,000. So, that would makes a producer surplus in housing market ( It show by diagram.2) due to  some households just willing to lend their house at illegal market, that means the rental is more than the rent ceiling price. Therefore, in America 93 percent of economists agreed that a ceiling on rents reduces the quantity of housing available, so there is a deadweight loss (Show by diagram.2) in housing market because the quantity of housing supplied is less than the efficient quantity.

In addition, Rent ceiling is unfair as rent control promote housing discrimination. By eliminating rents as the basis of choosing among a pool of potential consumers, rent control opens the door to discrimination based on other factors. As noted earlier, rent control forces housing providers to look to income and credit history in choosing among competing consumers, factors which sharply bias the selection process against poor and young consumers. In some cases, consumer selection decisions also may be based on a potential consumer's race, sex, family size or other improper or unlawful factors. There is another unfair of rent control is Rent Controls Unfairly Tax Rental Housing Providers. Rent controls are designed to supplement consumer income at the expense of rental property providers, by holding below market levels the permissible rate of return on rental property investment. There is substantial evidence that such transfers are highly inefficient. For example, housing consumers gained in benefits only 52 percent of what housing providers lost. So, the tax would on the households. This is due, in part, to the tendency of consumers in rent-controlled units to "hoard" housing and to be over-housed, a tendency that further exacerbates the underlying housing shortage. But more importantly, such income transfers pose fundamental questions of fairness. Why should the uniquely public burden of providing subsidized housing to the poor and middle class be borne solely by providers of rental housing? Given both the inefficiency and unfairness of the rent control "tax," I think government should rely on broader, more equitable means of subsidizing poor families.

                                                                                                        by Xu Zhi Peng

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